

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ROSS MILLER Secretary of State

November 1, 2012

Mr. John R. Phillippe, Jr. Chief Counsel Republican National Committee 310 First Street, SE Washington, D.C. 20003

VIA FACSIMILE

Dear Mr. Phillippe:

I am in receipt of an identical letter addressed to six (6) separate state chief election officials wherein you allege that "based on media and citizen reports of voting machine errors taking place," you understand that "in a number of cases, voting machines in your states have populated a vote for Barack Obama when a voter cast his or her ballot for Mitt Romney." Unfortunately, your letter fails to provide any direct evidence that any particular voter in Nevada experienced any "errors" with their voting machine or any details which could be used to open an investigation, including the names or contact information of any particular voter or polling location where "errors" have been reported in Nevada (or any of the other five states copied in your letter). To date, our multijurisdictional task force has not received any direct, first-hand complaints from voters experiencing voting machine errors of the type you describe.

Preliminarily, it is nearly technically impossible to pre-program the voting machines in Nevada to vote for a specified candidate because it is not a centralized process and is tested individually by each of Nevada's 17 counties. While it is possible for a voter to inadvertently select a candidate, it is not possible for the machine to automatically select a candidate.

Notably, my office investigated similar complaints and rumors in 2010 with the assistance of the FBI and the Nevada Attorney General's office and concluded that claims that our voting machines were pre-programmed, malfunctioning, or in any way preventing any voter from casting a ballot for the candidate of his or her choice were

without merit. At the conclusion of that investigation, Nevada's multi-jurisdictional Election Integrity Task Force concluded:

"This investigation, commenced the day following receipt of the request for investigation from counsel for the NRP, was completed in an expeditious manner so as to enable preparation and release of this report prior to Election Day. It was felt that the extensive media attention given to claims of voter fraud called for a speedy response in order to reassure the electorate that the voting process in Nevada is secure. My investigation reveals no evidence of voting machine tampering or voter fraud. It does reveal the presence of occasional human error in the election process, which cannot be avoided as long as humans are a part of the process. No amount of procedures can prevent error if the procedures are not followed. It is my opinion, after a review of the procedures in place for poll workers, that the procedures attempt to balance the need to prevent voting fraud at the polls, with the need to assure that every qualified voter is permitted to vote, and that said balance is achieved in these procedures."

A copy of the report of that investigation and the corresponding press release are attached for your review.

Your letter requests immediate action to mitigate any potential machine errors. While I cannot speak on behalf of the other five (5) states which received your letter, even a cursory review of Nevada's statutes, policies and procedures would have revealed the fact that Nevada has strong safeguards in place to address these concerns. Notably, during the process of casting their ballot on the touchscreen machines, Nevada voters are twice notified to review their selections. The first review screen instructs the voter to "Touch Here to Print and Review a Paper Record of Your Ballot." The second review screen further instructs the voter to "Please Review the Paper Record of Your Ballot. You May Now Cast Your Ballot or Make Changes." Furthermore, Nevada Administrative Code 293.240 requires the election day poll workers to state and prominently display the following statement at the polling place:

"If you have any questions or concerns about the mechanical voting device, please stop voting immediately and bring your question or concern to the attention of a member of the election board. Once you have cast your ballot, you will not be able to have your question or concern addressed by the election board."

Finally, polling locations in Nevada routinely perform calibration on the electronic voting machines on a daily basis, even during early voting.

Claims that challenge the integrity of our elections that are based solely upon rumor, hearsay or unconfirmed media reports are irresponsible and unfortunate because they undermine the public's confidence in the electoral process. As Nevada's Chief Officer of Elections, I take these issues very seriously and fully investigate these types of complaints when brought to my office's attention. Election complaints can be filed with

the Nevada Election Integrity Task Force and can found in the "Election Center" of the Secretary of State's website, www.nvsos.gov. Should you encounter any evidence of any irregularities beyond "media and citizen reports" that could be investigated by our Election Integrity Task Force, I strongly encourage you file an appropriate complaint.

Sincerely,

ROSS MILLER Secretary of State

cc: Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler
Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach
Missouri Secretary of State Robin Carnahan
North Carolina State Board of Elections Executive Director Gary Bartlett
Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted



REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

In the matter of the Nevada Republican Party Request for Investigation of Early Voting Issues in Washoe and Clark Counties – November 2, 2010 General Election

By: Carolyn Ellsworth, Esq. Securities Administrator Office of the Secretary of State

Dated this 29th day of October, 2010.

Introduction:

On October 25, 2010, the Election Division of the Office of the Secretary of State received, via hand delivery, a letter from the O'Mara Law Firm, PC, on behalf of its client, the Nevada Republican Party (NRP). Said letter consists of forty-four (44) pages including attachments, and indicates that the NRP had concerns regarding the early voting process. These concerns were based upon NRP's review of certain documents obtained from Washoe and Clark Counties' respective Voter Registrars.

Specifically, NRP had reviewed election board statements filed pursuant to NRS 293.3604. These statements are entitled "Polling Place Statement" in Clark County and "Early Voting Daily Balance Statement" in Washoe County. NRP, through its counsel, made several requests to the Secretary of State, including a request for investigation and a request that the form of the Clark County election board statements be changed. For organizational and clarity purposes, each of the requests and concerns will be addressed separately below. However, since all of NRP's concerns center around the early voting election board statements, a good starting place is the requirements of NRS 293.3604.

NRS 293.3604 provides:

NRS 293.3604 Mechanical recording devices: Duties of election board at close of each voting day; duties of ballot board for early voting and county clerk at close of last voting day. If ballots which are voted on a mechanical recording device which directly records the votes

electronically are used during the period for early voting by personal appearance in an election other than a presidential preference primary election:

- 1. At the close of each voting day, the election board shall:
- (a) Prepare and sign a statement for the polling place. The statement must include:
 - (1) The title of the election;
 - (2) The number of the precinct or voting district;
- (3) The number which identifies the mechanical recording device and the storage device required pursuant to NRS 293B.084;
 - (4) The number of ballots voted on the mechanical recording device for that day; and
 - (5) The number of signatures in the roster for early voting for that day.
 - (b) Secure:
 - (1) The ballots pursuant to the plan for security required by NRS 293.3594; and
- (2) Each mechanical voting device in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.3594.
- 2. At the close of the last voting day, the county clerk shall deliver to the ballot board for early voting:
 - (a) The statements for all polling places for early voting;
 - (b) The voting rosters used for early voting;
- (c) The storage device required pursuant to <u>NRS 293B.084</u> from each mechanical recording device used during the period for early voting; and
 - (d) Any other items as determined by the county clerk.
- 3. Upon receipt of the items set forth in subsection 2 at the close of the last voting day, the ballot board for early voting shall:
 - (a) Sort the items by precinct or voting district;
 - (b) Count the number of ballots voted by precinct or voting district;
 - (c) Account for all ballots on an official statement of ballots; and

(d) Place the items in the container provided to transport those items to the central counting place and seal the container with a numbered seal. The official statement of ballots must accompany the items to the central counting place.

NRS 293.217 provides that the county clerk of each county shall appoint registered voters to act as election board officers for the various precincts and districts in the county. The election board officers are commonly referred to as the "poll workers" at the particular polling place. In Clark and Washoe Counties, qualified registered voters can volunteer to serve as poll workers, and the recruitment of poll workers is continual. Poll workers must attend and pass training classes concerning their duties, responsibilities and the procedures for carrying out those duties. Poll workers are minimally paid volunteers who have the ability to work long hours (on election day about 14 hours) and, if they are early voting poll workers, to work long hours for up to two weeks straight.

The statements required by NRS 293.3604 are, in Washoe and Clark Counties, prepared on forms designed by the respective registrar. It is important to note that the statute does not require a particular form for the statement, but rather spells out the information which must be contained therein. I interviewed Harvard L. Lomax, the registrar for Clark County, and Daniel G. Burk, the registrar for Washoe County to obtain preliminary information necessary for my investigation.

EARLY VOTING PROCEDURE IN CLARK COUNTY

The polls are not closed during the early voting period. They are considered open for the entire 14 day early voting period. During early voting what happens is that each night when the early voting site shuts down, the number of

ballots on the machine is recorded by the poll workers, the machine is powered down and the data cartridge is removed by the poll workers who place the cartridge in a box and seal it with special seals for that purpose. Then, either the boxes are driven to the central elections department building by the workers or County election department workers pick the boxes up and drive them to the central elections department building. The information on the cartridges is downloaded to the computer so that the daily voting numbers can be released to the public on the County's election department website. The cartridges are locked in a vault at the central elections department building overnight and taken to the polling places the next morning in the same fashion. (i.e. either picked up by the poll workers or driven to the polling place by the county election department employees.) In the morning, after the cartridge is inserted back into the machine the poll worker verifies that the number of ballots recorded from the night before is the same as what it is showing in the morning. At the end of that voting day, the poll workers record the number of ballots on each machine and record those, together with the total for all machines, on the Polling Place Statement, and they manually count the number of signatures on the registered voter signature sheets and record it on the Polling Place Statement for that day. The statements are sent with the sealed cartridges to the central election department building.

Two reconciliations take place. The first takes place at the polling place where the workers count up the number of signatures on their voter registration signature sheets and compare that total with the total number of ballots recorded on the voting machines at the site. If there is a discrepancy, it is evident on the

statement and the workers are to note it on a discrepancy log. The second reconciliation is between the downloaded daily count on the machines and the data entered in the voter registration system at the poling place. This reconciliation process takes place at the Registrar's office and begins each night after early voting ends each day. The Registrar's "audit team," made up of Mr. Lomax and a small number of his employees, attempt to determine the source of any discrepancies found during the reconciliations.

EARLY VOTING PROCEDURES IN WASHOE COUNTY

Washoe County's procedures differ from those of Clark in that Washoe does not download the information from the voting machine cartridges each day.

Rather, the cartridges are removed from the machines sealed, and locked in a vault at each of the early voting sites. The poll workers at the sites also fill out daily statements (the form is slightly different from that of Clark County) which record the total number of ballots on each voting machine, and the total number of signatures on the voter registration roster sheets. Washoe County also has a live computerized registration system into which the poll workers input data as each voter checks in to vote. The daily statements filled out by the poll workers are picked up by the Registrar's office employees at each of the voting sites the next morning when the supplies for that new day's voting are delivered to the site. The statements are taken to the Registrar's office where they are placed into a basket on the desk of Luanne Cutler, Administrative Secretary to the Registrar. Ms. Cutler double checks the math of the poll workers and if there is any error, she notes that

on a separate tracking sheet which is attached to the statement. The total number of ballots on the machines, as recorded on the statements, is reconciled with the data entered into the voter registration system at the polls. Like Clark County, the Washoe County Registrar attempts to determine the source of any discrepancies.

ISSUE #1: Change in the form of the Clark County statement required by NRS 293.3604

The letter from NRP's counsel indicates that on the third day of early voting for the 2010 general election, the form of Clark County's daily "Polling Place Statement" was changed from a form which required the poll workers to hand write the total number of ballots showing on each voting machine in the morning prior to voting commencing, to a form which includes, pre-printed on the form, the number of ballots recorded at the close of voting the previous night, and requires that the worker compare the pre-printed number on form with the number on the machine and then check a box to verify that the number is the same. NRP believes that the change to the form "precludes the Registrar's office – or the public- from being able to independently verify those figures." Moreover, the NRP alleges that the revised form is "obviously less secure than requiring the poll watchers [sic] to record data from the voting machines without giving them the answers in advance." Examples of the original version of the form, as well as the revised versions of the form were attached to the NRP letter.

I interviewed Assistant Registrar Donna Cardinelli, regarding the history surrounding the creation of the NRS 293.3604 statement forms. Ms. Cardinelli

explained that the original form was a three part carbon-copy form. Columns 3 (Machine serial #) and 5 (Beginning number of votes) of that form had gray shading overlaying them. When representatives of the various political parties began requesting copies of the forms, and the forms were scanned so that they could be transmitted in electronic format, the gray shaded columns appeared black on the scanned copy. The entries in those columns were illegible. Thus, a new form was designed that could be scanned and still remain legible. When the new form was designed, it was decided that the beginning number of ballots on each machine would be self-populated into the form from the cartridge data download of that number. This would save the poll workers the trouble of re-recording by hand, the numbers that they had already recorded at the end of each day. Since the prior day's form could be compared against the next day's form, there was a sufficient audit trail. (i.e. The prior day's end of day handwritten totals can be compared against the next day's form.) The NRP's assertion that the change to the firm precludes the public from being able to independently verify the numbers is therefore without merit.

The methodology for determining the number of ballots voted each day for recordation upon the statement required by NRS 293.3604 is to record the total vote number on the machine at the end of the day and from that number, subtract the number of ending votes from the day before (which is the same number as the number at the start of the next day). The law only requires that the statement reflect the number of ballots voted each day. It does not require that the statement show the method of getting that number. But, for the sake of transparency, the

Registrar designed the form to show the backup for how the number was reached. Thus, there are columns which show the beginning number of voted ballots on each machine, the ending number on each machine, and then the difference between the two numbers – the total number of ballots recorded on the machine for the day. The totals for each machine are added and there is a place on the form for the total ballots cast on all machines for the day. The methodology is not changed by filling in the prior days total ballot number so that the poll workers don't have to manually record the number again each morning. They recorded the numbers by hand the night before and the data is confirmed by downloading from the cartridges the night before after the cartridges are delivered to the central election building vault. The filled in numbers are generated from that source and filled in automatically by the computer from the electronic data. After the new form was designed, the poll workers were trained to examine the machine, verify that the reading on the machine matches the self-populated beginning number on the form, and check a box indicating that they had made the verification. While copies of the old form are illegible (i.e. the identifying numbers for each machine are illegible and column 5, showing the running total at the end of the day, is also illegible.) in the new form, all the information is legible and the math of the poll workers can be double checked by members of the public who request access to these public documents. Thus, the new form appears to be superior to the old form.

ISSUE #1: Failure of the poll workers to check some or all of the verification boxes on the newly designed form.

The letter from the NRP's counsel attached copies of five (5) Clark County Polling Place Statements where the poll workers had failed to check the box indicating that they had verified that the read on the machine prior to voting beginning the next voting day, matched the number on the form that had been selfpopulated and printed on the form by the Registrar's office. The letter further called for an "investigation of any voting machines for which the Polling Place Statements fail to establish that the Beginning Count was verified...." As explained above, the ending numbers on the statements from the day before can be compared to the beginning numbers on the next days forms. Additionally, my interview of the Assistant Registrar who inspects the daily statements and meets with the team leaders after each days early voting, revealed that the failure in a few instances to check all or some of the verification boxes was merely an oversight by poll workers. These forms are already in the possession of the NRP as they were requested and provided by the Registrar. As a full audit trail is available, further investigation would serve no purpose.

ISSUE #2: Discrepancies between the total number of ballots voted as recorded on the voting machines, with the total number of signatures on the registered voter roster.

The letter from the NRP's counsel attached seven (7) copies of NRS 293.3604 statements. Five (5) of these statements were from Clark County and two were from Washoe County. The letter characterized discrepancies between the total number of ballots voted as recorded on the voting machines and the total number of

signatures on the registered voter roster as evidencing "'extra' votes [being] recorded on [the] voting machines. While such a conclusion does evidence faulty logic, the notation of a discrepancy does not prove counsel's conclusion.

Attachment 8:

I examined the Polling Place Statement for October 17, 2010 at the Pearson early voting site in Clark County. The statement shows that the total number of signatures on the early voting roster was 219. The statement also shows that the total number of ballots shown on the machines at the site that day was 220. I examined the daily summary of early voting totals on the Clark County Registrar's web-site. That summary shows that the total number of voters at the Pearson site was 220. I then downloaded, from the Registrar's web-site, the detail information which lists the names and other information of every voter who early voted on a particular day. The web-site contains a caution which reads:

<u>Please Note</u>: The information in the daily files has not yet been audited. During auditing, we may occasionally find and correct a clerical error. An audited cumulative turnout file for the election will be posted to clarify these errors.

This data is taken from the computerized check-in information which is input at the voting site by the poll workers when the voter checks in to vote. Since the data entry for each voter included the site where that person voted, I was able to sort by voting site and then determine the number of entries (1 per voter) for the Pearson site on 10/17/10. The total number showed 221, a difference of one more than showed on the voting machine count as reflected in the Polling Place Statement and

as shown in the daily summary on the Registrar's web-site. I then downloaded the audited cumulative turnout file and sorted by voting site and date in order to determine whether the number still showed 221. In fact, the audited cumulative report showed 220 early voters on 10/17/10 at the Pearson site. I then compared the data in the 10/17/10 early voting file with the data in the cumulative file and found that voter Earlene Kay Smith, ID#1210908, whose name had appeared on the daily un-audited report, was not on the audited cumulative report as having voted on 10/17/10. Rather, the cumulative report showed that she voted on 10/26/10 at the Centennial Center site. This would tend to indicate that the voting machine count of 220 was accurate, that an improper entry into the computerized registration data base had been made by the poll worker at the Pearson site and caught during the audit process so that the voter could vote. I obtained Ms. Smith's telephone number from the downloadable active registered voter database on the Registrar's website and on October 28, 2010, left her a detailed message identifying myself and asking that she return my call to verify that she had voted at the Centennial Center site. As of this writing, approximately four hours since the message was left, she has not returned my call.

Attachment 11:

I examined a copy of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement from the Scolari's 20 early voting site, dated October 19, 2010. I again asked that Criminal Investigator David Evans travel to the voting site in Reno to interview the poll worker who had signed the statement. Investigator Evans traveled to 8165 S.

Virginia Street in Reno and met with Ms. Betty Jo Vonderheide who identified herself as the team leader poll worker of the site. Ms. Vonderheide stated that they have seven (7) voting machines at her early voting site, and that they are the second busiest polling location in Washoe County. Investigator Evans showed her a copy of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement for October 19, 2010 and she identified the signature upon the statement as hers. Ms. Vonderheide stated that she filled out the Early Voting Daily Balance Sheet with all of the information and signed on the bottom left of the page above "Signature-Team Leader." She further stated that she recorded the total ballots cast on each of the voting machines and totaled all of the signatures on the roster sheets for this day. Ms. Vonderheide explained that the total number of ballots cast and total number of signatures on the roster sheets were verified by Ken Harrison, but that he did not sign the early voting daily balance statement. Ms. Vonderheide stated that she cannot account for the discrepancy between the total number of ballots cast on all voting machines (458), and the total number of signatures on roster sheets (457). She further stated that she remembered making the correction on the statement in the total number signatures on the roster sheets column (457) and that she should have initialed her change, but she was simply correcting her own handwriting mistake.

Attachment 12:

I examined the copies of the statements attached to counsel's letter and noted that attachment number 12, the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement of October 19, 2010 from Washoe County early voting site, South Valleys Library, had a

discrepancy of one (1) ballot/voter. The statement indicated that there had been one more ballot recorded on the machines than the number of voters who had signed in to vote. I also noted that the bottom of the statement contained handwritten notes which appeared to read "Mark Seeley 2 cast votes." I dispatched Criminal Investigator David Evan from the Reno office of the Secretary of State to travel to the South Valleys Library location with a copy of the aforementioned statement, and I instructed him to meet with the poll workers who had signed the statement and interview them as to the circumstances surrounding the information set forth on the subject statement. Investigator Evans met with Richard Jones who identified himself as the team leader poll worker of the South Valleys Library early voting site. Mr. Jones identified his signature on the bottom left of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement and indicated that he had filled our all of the information on the statement. Mr. Jones stated that he took the readings of the numbers of ballots from each of the twelve (12) machines at his site and he counted and totaled the number of signatures on the roster sheets for that day. These numbers were verified by June Wisniewski who signed on the lower bottom right of statement.

Mr. Jones explained the voting process to Investigator Evans as follows: When a person comes into vote, he or she must either produce their sample ballot or a valid identification card. If a sample ballot is given, the bar code on the sample ballot is scanned into the laptop, which will then bring up the voter information, at which time the intake person is to verify the person's ID with the screen information. If no sample ballot is given, but rather an identification card,

the intake person will then type the voter's name into the system and look them up that way. Once the intake person has located the voter in the system, the system's message is "use that voter." Once this message is clicked, the system sends the voter information to the activator, a separate system connected to the computer that produces the voter card. Before a voter is allowed to vote, they must sign a voter roster sheet.

Mr. Jones explained to Investigator Evans that on October 19, 2010, a Mr. Mark Seeley came in to vote. Mr. Seeley was verified in the computerized system and given a card to vote, which Mr. Seeley used to vote before leaving the polling site. After Mr. Seeley voted, another unknown voter came in. According to Mr. Jones, Mr. Seeley's information was still on the intake person's screen, which is normal. However, the intake person did not update the screen with the new voter information. Mr. Jones stated that with Mr. Seeley's information still on the screen, the intake person then clicked "use that voter". Mr. Jones stated that the computer would have given a message warning that the selected voter may have previously voted on this date, time and location. If such a warning message displays, the prescribed procedure is for the poll worker to call the Registrar's office for further instructions. However, the intake person instead clicked "activate voter card" and the information for Mr. Seeley was sent to the Activator, and another card was printed with Mr. Seeley's information on it and given to the unknown voter who then voted with this card. Mr. Jones stated that after voting, the unknown voter commented to the intake person that his voting choices did not look correct when he voted. Mr. Jones stated it was at this time that he became

involved and realized the error made by the intake person. Mr. Jones stated that they then found this voter in the system, printed out another card for him, and allowed him to vote a second time under his correct name. Obviously, this voter should not have been allowed to cast a second ballot, but the facts do not demonstrate intentional voter fraud on the part of the poll workers or the unidentified voter who was allowed to cast two ballots.

Mr. Jones stated that the total number of votes cast on all edge voting machines (567) was one number over the total number of signatures on roster sheets (566) because 2 votes were cast under Mr. Seeley's name. Mr. Jones stated that a note was made on the bottom right hand side of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement noting that 2 votes had been cast for Mark Seeley, ID 374123, and precinct 2035.

Due to time constraints occasioned by the desire to complete this report prior to Election Day, I did not do further investigation of the remaining four Statements as three involved only a one vote discrepancy and one involved only a two ballot discrepancy. The statement with the apparent two vote discrepancy (Attachment 13) involves provisional signatures and provisional ballots cast so that it is likely that confusion arose over this issue when filling out the statement. The Registrar's office website is reporting the total ballots cast at the questioned sites in the same numbers as shown on the poll worker statements taken from their readings of the machines and calculations made at the end of the day. I checked the math on each of these statements and found them to be correct. Since the count by the Registrar is taken from the cartridges and matches the poll workers count, the

greater likelihood is that the count of the signatures on the Roster is incorrect and was discovered during the reconciliation process described.

ISSUE #3: "Audit Boards"

The letter from counsel for NRP expresses concern that an "Audit Board" which examines voting discrepancies in Clark and Washoe County exists. This conclusion was reached after the Clark County Registrar, in apparently casual conversation with persons unidentified by counsel, was attempting to explain his office's election reconciliation process. I interviewed both registrars and each explained that any discrepancies noted in the reconciliation process were examined by the respective registrars and their employees in an attempt to discover the reasons therefore. This work is done in the normal course of conducting the election and reporting on the results of the final canvas. There are no "Audit Boards" apart from the registrars and their election department employees. The registrars are subject to and aware of the public record disclosure law in Nevada. The NRP request that the Secretary of State direct the registrars to disclose the matters they are investigating prior to public records being produced is inappropriate.

ISSUE #4: Handwritten Changes to Daily NRS 293.3604 Statements

The letter from counsel for NRP notes the existence of handwritten revisions on the Daily Statements and attaches copies of three (3) Statements which contain such revisions. Particular concern was expressed over changes to an Early Voting

Daily Balance Statement from Washoe County (Attachment 16 to the letter) which apparently contained "white-out" tape.

I dispatched Criminal Investigator David Evans to travel to the Washoe County Registrar of Voters office at 1001 E. Ninth Street in Reno. The office is also an early voting site and was where the Statement containing the "white-out" correction tape was completed.

Investigator Evans spoke with Ms. Luanne Cutler, Administrative Secretary to Registrar Burk, and with Ms. Julie Penman, a poll worker team member. While at the site, Ms. Cutler and Penman told him the following regarding the Early Voting Daily Balance Sheet dated October 16, 2010 that contained 2 pages:

Ms. Penman stated that she and Sarah Britt, who was not present but out to lunch at the time of Investigator Evans' interview, filled out the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement for October 16, 2010. Ms. Penman stated that Sara Britt calculated the numbers in only the far right column under Violet Open/Close Polls Seal (L), and that she (Penman) completed all of the other information on both pages. Ms. Cutler pulled the original form from the Registrar's files when Investigator Evans discussed the document with Ms. Penman. Evans noted that there is a noticeable difference in handwriting in the columns of the document and that this is consistent with Ms. Penman's explanation about who filled in each area of the statement.

Ms. Penman stated she and Ms. Britt both verified the total number of ballots cast and total number of signatures on the roster sheets, and that they were unable to reconcile the differences in the numbers (147) for total number of votes

cast and (148) for total signatures on roster sheets. Ms. Cutler stated that this is not common but does happen occasionally if a voter leaves after signing in and without casting their ballot. Ms. Penman verified that she used the correction tape on both pages of the document after errors had been made.

Lastly, Evans noted that the original documents showed no numbers in the boxes to the right after total number of votes cast on all voting machines, or total number of signatures on roster sheets, and that instead the poll workers had incorrectly written the numbers on the lines to the left of the boxes. The empty boxes to the right did not show any evidence of erasure or white-out.

The other two statements attached by counsel are cross-outs commonly made to correct minor mistakes and there is nothing about them that would warrant further investigation.

ISSUE #5: Exception logs

The letter from counsel for NRP asks that the Secretary of State direct the Registrars to disclose exception logs "and other similar documents." It is unclear as to whether any public records request has been made for any such documents. As stated above, the Registrars are aware of Nevada public record law, as are their respective legal counsel. Moreover, the Secretary of State does not enforce the public record disclosure law. It would be inappropriate for the Secretary of State to direct the registrars concerning records requests which have not yet been made and which the registrars are capable of processing in conformity with Nevada law.

CONCLUSION:

This investigation, commenced the day following receipt of the request for investigation from counsel for the NRP, was completed in an expeditious manner so as to enable preparation and release of this report prior to Election Day. It was felt that the extensive media attention given to claims of voter fraud called for a speedy response in order to reassure the electorate that the voting process in Nevada is secure. My investigation reveals no evidence of voting machine tampering or voter fraud. It does reveal the presence of occasional human error in the election process, which cannot be avoided as long as humans are a part of the process. No amount of procedures can prevent error if the procedures are not followed. It is my opinion, after a review of the procedures in place for poll workers, that the procedures attempt to balance the need to prevent voting fraud at the polls, with the need to assure that every qualified voter is permitted to vote, and that said balance is achieved in these procedures.

ATTACHMENT 1

Polling	Place Stateme November 2, 201	nt (Early Votin 0 General Election	ng - Daily)
Polling Place: 5			Date: 10/16/10
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e do hereby certify the	t the above informatio	n is a true and correc	ct statement of voting
MINHI/ONT	at the politing place, as	d for the election indica	ted phove.
rty Voting Politon Place Offici	al's Signature	Early Voting Polling Pi	nce Official's Signature HyPomyPPStateGen_EV.dop

H/Param/PPStainGen_EV.dop

ATTACHMENT 2

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

PART I: Account of Signature TOTAL SIGNATURES in E TOTAL PROVISIONAL SIGNATURE.		and the same		
	arly Voting R	andsta		
TOTAL PROVISIONAL SI		efater:	44	1117
	GNATURES:		7	0
PART II: Account of Ballots	Cast			
	₽.3)¢		NATIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR	
The state of the s	Verified	Beginning Count	Ending Count	Turnout
34408	$ \mathbf{Z}$	104	132	08
34409		98	127	89
34410	\square	91	132	41
34411	V	83	124	16.1
34412	\square	77	115	90
34413		81	138	57
34414	\square	59	109	50
34415		61	118	67
34416	\square	39	107	10
34417	\square	28	109	01
34418	abla	79	157	20
34419	\square	52	117	15
34420	$ \mathbf{Z} $	81	160	-00
34421		96	164	10
34422	Ø	93	163	70
		107	170	13
34424	Z)	109	167	50
		105	160	55
34426		94	127	33
	V	86	144	28
			77	Vo
al Provisional Votes:	770 6	10.00		
- carbaba.			l Public Counter:	///7 4
the machine serial numbers li	isted above ma	ich those on the ma	chines? Yes	☐ No
cribe any Discrepancies:				
lo hereby certify that the above	e information	المسائد المعادد المعاد		
to hereby certify that the above ate, at the polling place, and j	for the election	indicated above.	uniament of voting ex	zculed by us on
Voting Polling Place Official's Sig		AUK	Sale >	

ATTACHMENT 3

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

		rei 2, 2010 General	Liection	10/0/0
Polling Place: TRAI		andiso t are	Dat	le: 10/18/10
PART I: Account of S	ignatures			
TOTAL SIGNATURE	S in Early Voting	Register:		
TOTAL PROVISION	AL SIGNATURES	3:		X
PART II: Account of I	Ballots Cast			
	A 6 16		olis , Zmi	
Machine#	Verified	Beginning Count	Ending Count	Turpout
34202		0	- avant	. arbout
34203		0		
34204		0		
34205		0		
34206		0		
34207		0		
34208		74	122	48
34209	4	90	140	50
34210	(2)	92	145	53
34211		92	143	51
· 342 <u>12</u>	4	85	119	34
34213	P	78	193	45
34214	a	67	TOI	34
34215		66	166	48
34216		38	(,3	25
34217	Œ,	39	59	20
34218	1	21	. 3 0	9
34219	Ø	27	35	8
34220	Ø.	72	133	60
34221		61	II Co	.5.5
34222		63	113	H3 50
34223		70	126	56
34224	U	50	96	47.



34225

ATTACHMENT 4

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

TRAILER 2				Date: 18 //9/
PART I: Account of Si			,	1
	TURES in Early			573
	SIONAL SIGNA	TURES:		
PART II: Account of B				,
34202	Verified	Beginning Count 0	Ending Count	Ternost
34203		0	30	- <u>38</u>
34204		0	34	- 24
34205		O	38	38
34206		0	. 43	43
34207	- 00.000	0	3.5	35
34208 34209	<u> bourned</u>	122	160	_38
34210	H	140	168	<u> 28</u>
34211	Ħ	145 143	1/25	$\frac{32}{1a}$
34212		119	133	17
34213	· 🗆	123	136	13,
34214		101		
34215 34216	- 1	106	4	
34217		63	-4/	· .
34218	H	59 30		
34219		35		
34220		132	159	27
34221	. 🗖	116	152	36
34222		113	14.5	32
34223 34224		126	156	30_
34225		96 97	120	-37
	_	37	130	_ 7/_
PASSEE				· .
l Provisional Votes:	N I		**************************************	
			l Public Counter:	573
he machine serial num ribe any discrepancies	ners listed above n	natch those on the mi	chines? Xes	No
atos any discrepancies			<u> </u>	
lo hereby certify that the	above information	n is a true and correct	statement of votih	executed by us on
	and for the election	on indicated above.	A Y	7
	100000			

ATTACHMENT 5

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

PART I: Account of S	ignatures			ite: 10/19/2010
TOTAL SIGN	ATURES in Early	Voting Register:		1,100
TOTAL PROVISIONAL SIGNATURES:				1.100 Ø
PART II: Account of F	(009/31/	3.74	50050555 55	
Machine#	Verified	Beginning Count	Ending Count	Turnost
33989		129	176	47
33990	図	137	179	42
33991	<u>(</u>	138	187	49
33992	\square	118	162	44
33993	\square	108	148	40
33994	$\stackrel{\longrightarrow}{\simeq}$	93	126	33
33995 33996	칫	100	131	_3/
33996 33997	N	67	89	22
33997 33998		64	87	_ 23
33998 33999	以 区	68	- 88	_20
34000	. ☆	63	96	33
34001		56	<u>73</u>	
34002	[2]	59 71	90	31
34003	র বি্যার তার ব্যব্যব্যব্যব্যব্যব্যব্য	71 103	100	29
34004		103 62	146	43
34005	ल	124	170	46 :
34006	Ĭ	108	(39	3
34007		97	131	34
34008		119	149	30
34009	Q	108	141	_33
34010	M	94	12	2 7
34011	\square	99	124	25
34012	Nabaaaaaa	86	109	23
34013	$oldsymbol{arnothing}$	76	101	- 25
34014		58	74	16
34015	回	41	54	
34016 34017		77	95	18
34017 34018	<u> অতা বেধ্ব ব্যব্য বিষ্ঠান বিষ্</u>	84	104	<u> </u>
34019	X	72	93	21
34020	[-]	75	96	21
34021		91	122	31
34022	N	102 117	138 153	36 36
34023	Ħ	117	152	30
34024	ল	137	172	38
34025	$\overline{\omega}$	55	70	35
34026	\exists	34	42	8
34027		18	24	"
34028	[2]	10	18	8

Administra
Total Public Counter: 1.100
n the machines? Yes No
correct statement of voting executed by us on bove.



ATTACHMENT 6

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

MOBILE TEAM 9			Date:	10/201
PART I: Account of Sig				
TOTAL SIGNA	TURES in Early Vo	oting Register:		739
TOTAL PROVE	SIONAL SIGNATI	URES:		0
PART II: Account of Br	llots Cast		10 to 4 to 1 d	* *************************************
Machine#	Verified	Beginning Count	Ending Count	Turnout
34428	Ø	204	239	35
34429		191	223	32
34430	4	204	234	30
34431	U	193	226	33
34432		197	249	52
34433	画	198	<i>25</i> 5	57
34434	P	169	204	35
34435	W.	158	184	26
34436	9	224	251	27
34437		274	314	40
34438	3	126	168	42
34439		103	124	21
34440	W.	107	138	31
34441		112	145	.33
34442		110	150_	40
34443	4	118	162	44
34444	1	111	140	29
34445		121	167	46
34446		255	295	40
34447		251	297	46
24 JF C 1913 PA				
al Provisional Votes:	@	To	tal Public Counter:	739
the machine serial num	bers listed above m	ofch those on the	nachinas? De va	¬No
cribe any discrepancies				
		yly, so st		
do kereby certify they th	e aboue to farm at			
date of the notification	mjormanos	a a true and corre	ct statement of voting exc	cuted by us on
date, at the polling place	, and for the electio	n indicated above.	,	

TRAILER 2		AND THE RESERVE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT	Date	10/2//
PART I: Account of S	ignatures ATURES in Early Vo	other Parleton		447
	ISIONAL SIGNAT			0
PART II: Account of E	2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		A	
Machine # 34202 34203 34204 34205 34206 34207 34208 34209 34210 34211 34212 34213 34214 34215 34216 34217 34218 34219 34220 34221 34222 34223 34224 34225	Verification	88 81 71 72 86 72 203 197 200 178 137 146 101 106 63 59 30 35 159 152 145 156 132 145	197 192 192 192 193 193 193 193 195	36 36 36 36 37 33 38 37 35 6 33 36 33 36 33 36
otal Provisional Votes:	10		l Public Counter:	441
o the machine serial nur seribe any discrepancie		atch these on the me	schines? Yes	□ No
e do hereby certify that it date, at the polling place	he above information e, and for the election	is a true and correct	statement of voting co	ecuted by as on
reitte A	Doens	/	WILD /	
Vottes Pality Place Off	cial's Signature	Early Voting P	olling Place Official's Sign	Mture

	Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election	
	Polling Place: DR PEARS ON TEAM 10 Date: 10-17-2010	
	PART I: Account of Signatures	
-	TOTAL SIGNATURES In Factor Vestor Party	
ļ	TOTAL PROVISIONAL SIGNATURES:	
i	2. 9-	
I	PART II: Account of Ballots Cast	
	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	
	4. Public Counter # Ending 3.3 3.3 3.5 1.6 2.6 2.7 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7	
	13	
	Total Provisional Votes: 7. Total Public Counter (Sum Col. 6)	220
7	the machine serial numbers listed above match those on the machines?	
D	eacribe any Discrepancies:	
ŧ	to do hereby certify that the above information is a tree and correct statement of voting tocated by us on the date, at the polling place, and for the election indicated above. The first Voting Polling Place Official's Signature Early Voting Polling Place Official's Signature	

Polling Place: CENTI	ENNIAL CENT	ER TRAILER	Dat	e: 10-18-10
PART I: Account of Sign			-	
TOTAL SIGNATURES	in Early Voting R	egister:		1215
TOTAL PROVISIONAL	L SIGNATURES:			. Orakan
PART II: Account of Ba	llots Cast	- 100 mm AAA	of final and the second of the	Toposchi C H. C .
	12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Add the same of th	e tyres	
Machine #	Verified	Beginning Count	Ending Count	Turnout
34133		75	128	53
34134	V	78	119	4/
34135	Q ²	73 ′	122	49
34136		87	138	51
34137		92	. 146	54
34138		98	160	62
34139		107	143	56
34140		128	198	70
34141	囡,	120	184	64
34142	IZ .	115	- 184	69
34143	团	112	169	57
34144	THE STATE OF THE S	104	159	55
34145	团	98	144	46
34146	团,	102	159	57
34147		153	224	71
34148		148	216	68
34149		139	214	75
34150		131	216	85
34151		99	170	71
34152		90	150	40
al Provisional Votes:	0	Test	al Public Counter:	44
	Illete de la constitución de la	<u>-</u>		1216
the machine serial numb cribe any Discrepancies:	I SEE EXC	atch those on the mi	achines? Yes	☐ No
do hereby certify that the late, at the politing place,	above information and for the election	is a true and correct indicated above.	statement of voting es	cecuted by us on
toxantemaken)	<i>/</i>	Jan	of Thom	
ly Voting Politing Piece Officia	al's Signature	Each Voting &	olike Place Official's Sign	entere

Page I of I

Date: 10-18-10
Abit of the second seco
877

PART II: Account of Ballots Cast

	87. BAG			
	302 2000	্নার্যা,	E TOTAL ST	
Machine #	Verified	Beginning Count	Eading Count	Turnout
34074		49	73	24
34075		38	60	33
34076	13/	45.	73	28
34977	\square	43	71	28
34078		48	78	_ 30
34079	O .	40	69	
34080		51	78	
34981	Ø	65	OL.	37
34082		65	76	34
34083	1	76	17/1	38
34084		82.	122	40
34085		86	136	
34086	<u> </u>		136	50 48
34087		73	12~	
34088		77	127	50
34089	<u> </u>	59	88	<u> </u>
34090	Image: Control of the	53	88	35
34091	Ø	68		35
34092		67	107	<u> 40</u>
34093		67	102	35
34094		84	123	39
34095		81	194	
34096	A R	84	125	41
34097		98	1.34	36
34098	B	64	93	29
J-1078	LA	66	103	37
_				

Fotal Provisional Votes: Do the machine serial numbers listed abov Describe any Discrepancies:	
re do nevely certify that the above informative date, at the polling place, and for the electric voting Polling Place Official's Signifure	tion is a true and correct statement of voting executed by us on cition indicated above. Early Voting Polling Flace Official Fe Signature

Public Number Daily Total 8 2 73 This sealed bag has been placed in the rolling vault and locked with a padlock and securely stored overnight. We, the undersigned, Certify the above information is True and Correct, and the Result Cartridges have been placed in a protective bag, sealed with the black of not be not been placed in a protective bag, sealed with the sealed with and locked with a padiock and securely stored overnight. Number of Provisional Ballots Issued: Ending Public Number 250 回 249 246 246 269 287 Beginning Public Number 88 80 28 3 214 롈 93 EARLY VOTING DAILY BALANCE STATEMENT Signature-Team Member 01/6/10 Daily Protective Number Count 611 9 0 76 2 DATE: Blue Plastic Cartridge Bag Seal Number when opening 406654 Total Number of Votes Cast on all Edge Voting Machines on this day: Protective Number 1224 1368 12% 192 1482 1037 176 Number of Signatures from Early Voting Roster Sheets: Total Number of signatures on Roster Sheets this day: _ Beginning Protective Number 1406 434 1911 496 23 ব্ৰ 3/ colacis 20 Closing RED Cartridge Door Seat 8/1/01 58+101 100769 10/494 787101 10/450 268001 Results Opening RED 101473 Results Cartridge 100873 Door Seal 128001 914101 888001 1410, 16/10/ Signature-Team Leader LOCATION: Edge Machine 3750 33738 3800 298 Serial No. 799 3748 33797 3 33

Date

DATE South Ualleys Library LOCATION:

U403659 Blue Plastic Cartridge Bag Seal Number when opening

EARLY VOTING DAILY BALANCE STATEMENT

Number of Provisional Ballots Issued; Number of Signatures from Early Voting Roster Sheets: 566

		ı,		Martin Martin Comment				1
Edge Machine Serial No.	Results Cartridge Door Seal	Closing RED Results Cartridge Door Seal	Beginning Protective Number	Ending Protective Number	Daily Protective Number Count	Beginning Public Number	Ending Public Number	Daily Total Public Number
22723		*	(c)	(9)	(0)	(O)	(E)	E
37.72	0465420	40341		1/25	v(١,		
33767	/ heroix	A0353	1216	A.F.	49	2	(3	Ø
33801	Oumana	Anzun		1 1333	134	5.3	117	64
		1631	11.53	1166	33	40	22	3>
23/62	D450079	HO 339	573	928	2,3	20		
33.79/	1740678	A0343	1234	215			2/	56
33.782	C407040	A0319	1700	6 4 13	2	35	67	5/
33767	DayPe and	00311	06)	1/67	49	34	58	49
33764	Dungetu	1000	12.1	100	09	44	109	0%
	A COLOR	40595	4.50/	89//	50	4.5	52	700
	Uyoore/	A 0342	513	273	4	3/1		20
33750	D400140	40330	8.85	926	3	7,	15/	2,2
					ने	Ŋ	7	

Total Number of Votes Cast on all Edge Voting Machines on this day; Total Number of signatures on Roster Sheets this day: _

567

This sealed bag has been placed in the rolling vault and locked with a padhock and securely stored overnight. A CAN UNES Mark Selly 202746 9 200 9 We, the undersigned, Certify the above information is True and Correct, and the Result Cartridges have been placed in a protective bag, sealed with the Signature-Team Member and 100 175 1070 19 19 110 Date A 335 3 400EF 337855 Uybu17

28

.56

PART I: Account of 8				Date	10/33
TOTAL SIGN		Early Vetine	Parletan		12
TOTAL PROV					20
		IGNATURE	8:		<u> </u>
PART II: Account of I					
Machine # 34163	Verified	Not Used	Baginning Count	Ending Count	Turnout
34164	Y	\vdash	104	127	23
34165			48	73	25
34166	<u> </u>		44	67	23
34167	W.		33	54	21
34168			41	61	20
34169	13		27	47	20
34170	N N		15	35	20
34171		님	36	55	19
34172			42	64	32
34173	IX		45	69	24
34174	N	Н	71	94	23
34175		H	44	(0)	24
34176		H	72	98	26
34177	Ø		37	19	23
	$\tilde{\Box}$	H	* 59	79	_20
][
				2011	
	<u> </u>			and the second s	
al Provisional Votes:	3		Total Pu	blic Counter:	333 v
the machine serial nur	ubers listed	above match	those on the purchi-		IN _o
cribe any discrepancie	# :				
to hereby certify that the late, at the polling place	te above infe	rmation is a	true and correct state	ment of voting exce	cuted by us or
late, at the polling place	e, and for th	e election ind	icated above,	1 4	

PART I: Account of S TOTAL SIGN TOTAL PROV PART II: Account of Machine # 34074 34075	VISIONAL S Ballots Cast Vertified				77/
PART II: Account of Machine # 34074	VISIONAL S Ballots Cast Vertiled	IGNATURE			
PART II: Account of Machine # 34074	Ballots Cast Verified		3 :		
Machine # 34074	Verified	Not I lead			
34074	回		Beginning Count	Ending Count	Turnout
2/076			137	148	1 Urnout
24812			122	130	8
34076			149	161	12
34077			149	163	14
34078	W	· Sand	177	195	18
34079			150	174	24
34080 34081			149	170	- 21
34082			186	213	27
34083			219	347	28
34084	Ī		248 259	287	<u> </u>
34085		٦.	306	339	33
34086			275	307	32
34087			297	33/	34
34088			190	213	23
34089			197	226	29
34090	व्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव्यव		228	2101	33
34091 34092			248	279	31
34093	<u> </u>		250	287	37 36
34094	ष्रम्ववव्यव्यव्	H	285 281	321	41
34095			284	3 25	111
34096	Z		275	. 309	34
34097			148	163	15
34098			173 🗸	188	15
34475			127	144	32
34476 34477	DD	H	97	123.	26
34478		H	97	1/8	21
34479			122 143	146	28 28
-		$\overline{\Box}$	173		- 51
l Provisional Votes:			Total Pu	bilc Counter:	772 4
he machine serial nu	mbers listed r	bove match			No
ribe any discrepanci					

We do hereby certify that the above information is a true and correct statement of voting executed by us on the date, at the polling place, and for the election indicated above.

Early Voting Polling Place Official's Signature

Early Voting Polling Place Official's Signature

MOUREVARD MILL - Page 2-6/2

PART I: Account of Signa TOTAL SIGNATU TOTAL PROVISION PART II: Account of Balls Machine #	RES in Early V ONAL SIGNAT		e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	847
TOTAL PROVISION PART II: Account of Balls	ONAL SIGNAT		in the state of th	2
PART II: Account of Ballo		27		
				1,7 (87
34153 34154 34155 34156 34157 34158 34159 34160 34161 34162	প্রতাম্যার বিভাগ কর্ম কর্ম কর্ম কর্ম কর্ম কর্ম কর্ম কর্ম	253 238 271 258 250 249 254 269 128 123	Ending Count 293 272 318 295 291 285 296 310 146 134	Turpout 40 34 37 41 36 42 41 18
tal Provisional Votes:	7_		l Public Counter:	344
the machine serial number scribe any discrepancies:	rs listed above	mutch those on the me	echines? Yes	□N ₀

WOLET OPEN CLOSE POLLS SEAL EONZ EDSBO C0 925 E0587 £0972 E1685 E093 E1964 E1695 E OBIS 의 8 ORANGE VVPAT SEAL F01080 F1030 F1523 Flore 0645 F 1055 FISHD F1359 EISI 9 FIDLA Φ RED results cartridge door seel for end of the Notal Number of signatures on Roster Sheets this day

We, the undersigned, Certify the above information is True and Correct, and the Result Cartridges have been placed. In a protective hag, sealed with the RELUE PARTIC seal, further

This sealed with the Particle Seal, further the place of the reling yauft and locked with a padick and securely stored overnight.

Signature-Team Leader

Signature-Team Member

Date Number of Provisional Ballots Issued: A101833 CB3/H 913810 day (H) AIO19 PIS49 91543 A 101132 AIS3B BIOCK The B Dally Total Public Number EARLY VOTING DAILY BALANCE STATEMENT Ø Ending Public g 9 147 ŏ 8 FIRST DAY DATE: 10-110- 9010 Beginning Public Number Total Number of Votes Cast on all Edge Voting Machines on this day ٥ 0 a O a O 0 Number of Signatures from Early Voting Roster Sheets: IUBDaily Protective Number Count e 0 ₫ 7 0 ឮ œ Target Man 1180 1180 SS **128** 8 318 छ Roc 1204 853 B Friday Protective Number 248 0000 Ser 149 1010 1001 769 8 852 ョ alle RED Goor stilling LOCKTION: KOV Section 1 多市の 28.53.14 3773 33870 347/69 37.13 33847 1827

WOLST OPEN CLOSE POLLS SEAL EOTA E165 2 288 N 路 ORANGE WYPAT SEAL FORCO FIGUE ᄅ We, the undersigned, Certify the above information is True and Correct, and the Result Cartridges have been placed in a protective bag, sealed with the BLUE PLANTING Seal, I with the sealed bag has been placed in the results and securely stored overhight.

| Place | Pla RED results cartridge door sent for and of the day (H) 911/823 Number of Provisional Ballots Issued: ARDIT Daily Total Public Number EARLY VOTING DALLY BALANCE STATEMENT ত্র Ending Public Number 目 3 0 FIRST DAY DATE: 10-110-2017 Beginning Public Number 回 ٥ Total Number of Votes Cast on all Edge Voting Machines on this day Daily Protective Number Count. Number of Signatures from Early Voting Roster Sheets: ह ē Ć Protective Number 을 등 Q 622 100 LOCATION: ROY RED results certridge door seal 3#33 3875

News

Secretary of State Releases Investigation Report on Election Complaint

Posted 10/29/2010

Date:

My investigators have thoroughly reviewed the requirements under state law; interviewed individuals with the voter registrars' offices in Washoe and Clark Counties, including the Registrars themselves; and reviewed extensive documentation and voting records. I have absolute confidence in the conclusion that the integrity of our election has not been impacted. My office and the Election Integrity Task Force will continue to aggressively investigate any credible complaints of election law violations.

Click here to view full report

EDITORS' NOTE: The complaint was submitted as a complaint by the Nevada Republican Party. However, the investigation revealed that David O'Mara does not represent the Nevada Republican Party. Mr. O'Mara now indicates he has been retained by the Nevada GOP Victory Committee.